Abstract: A pricing mechanism for product evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided. This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations: uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock, and Dutch clock auctions. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that (1) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (2) the four mechanisms are behaviorally equivalent. This second point is particularly noteworthy given that differing behavior is routinely observed in private value auctions with certain valuations.
I. Introduction
As the technology of electronic exchange advances, new opportunities emerge for developing markets for products and services whose innate properties hamper efforts to do so in traditional settings. Even though one such good, product evaluations, has been long used for durable and nondurable goods alike, t he transaction costs associated with providing and disseminating product evaluations have limited the scope of their use. The Internet not only has the potential to significantly reduce the transactions costs for evaluation sharing, but it can also significantly reduce the costs for forming a centralized market mechanism to allocate evaluations. Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (1999) provide the first fundamental step in creating a pricing mechanism to induce the efficient provision of evaluations. They develop several different mechanisms to solve three problems associated with the peculiar properties of evaluations: underprovision, inefficient ordering, and optimal quantity of evaluations.
Evaluations can be underprovided because they are generally nonrivalrous; 1 the evaluators themselves may be inefficiently ordered because they each have an opportunity cost o f producing an evaluation, namely deferring the consumption decision and waiting for more information; and the optimal quantity can depend on what the early evaluations reveal about the value of the product.
As a starting point to tackle these three problems, Avery et al. (1999) pragmatically assume in their analysis that the centralized broker knows the pool of values for the players in the market. This paper relaxes that assumption. Using the experimental method, we study how efficiently four different a uction formats voluntarily elicit an evaluation in exchange for payment, without any information on the pool of values. More specifically, we develop versions of and then compare the efficiency and prices for uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock, and Dutch clock auctions in providing an evaluation for a product. We follow Avery et al. (1999) in considering an auction framework in which people have already made the decision to enter a product market. The individuals in our markets have the same tastes for whether a product is "good" or "bad" and the same ability to discern those tastes.
Individuals, however, differ in their values for a "good" or "bad" product. Unlike Avery et al. 1 As Avery et al. point out in their footnote 3, positive evaluations for some products (e.g., stocks or restaurants) may increase demand and hence could be rivalrous.
(1999), we make the simplifying assumption that a single evaluation perfectly reveals whether the product is "good" or "bad."
We find in our controlled test that the provision of evaluations is markedly inefficient without a market mechanism, but not nearly as inefficient as the model predicts. Additionally, we find that each of the four auction mechanisms succeeds at increasing market efficiency by encouraging the optimal agent to undertake the costly evaluation when no one else is willing to do so. Lastly, we observe that the four mechanisms are behaviorally equivalent with respect to the prices received by the evaluator. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the experimental design that we consider, and Section III outlines the treatments and procedures.
Section IV discusses our results, and Section V briefly concludes.
II. Experimental Design
Suppose there are two risk neutral individuals each looking for the services of a lawyer.
A particular lawyer could be "good," resulting in a payoff of g > 0, or "bad," resulting in a payoff of b < 0 with | b | > | g |. If each outcome is equally likely, then both individuals have a negative expected value for trying out the services of the lawyer, and hence should opt for their next best alternative, provided that alternative payoff c is greater than (g + b)/2. However, neither person using the lawyer is not necessarily socially optimal. Consider the case where one individual decides to retain the lawyer and then provides an evaluation to the other potential client. In this case the evaluator expects to receive (g + b)/2, but the person receiving the evaluation can make a more informed decision. This informed person will go to the attorney if she is "good" and receive a payoff of g. However, if the evaluator reports that the lawyer is "bad," the other potential client will not employ the lawyer, choosing the opportunity cost c over the bad payoff b. Hence the person receiving the evaluation has an expected payoff of (g + c)/2, and the social payoff from one person evaluating the lawyer is (g + b)/2 + (g + c)/2, which is greater than 2c so long as c < (2g + b)/3.
The solution to this problem lies with the creation of a market that allows one potential consumer to compensate another for undertaking the costly evaluation. Avery et al. (1999) present a formal treatment of this problem and show the existence of an equilibrium price that attains the socially efficient outcome. 2 In the example presented above, the unique equilibrium price, p, is (c -b)/4. This price is found by equating the expected payoff of the evaluator to the expected payoff of the person who waits; i.e. p insures that (g + b)/2 + p = (g + c)/2 -p thereby making the two identical people indifferent between evaluating and waiting.
A. Institutions
Armed with the theoretical ability of a market to solve this problem, the next step is to identify what market institutions should be implemented in practice. The identification of the market price in the preceding paragraph requires collective knowledge of t hree pieces of information for each individual i, namely g i , b i , and c i , plus the probabilities that the product or service is "good" or "bad." In practice, these pieces of information are typically private and unobservable (or unverifiable). Thus, one role of a functioning market is to aggregate private information and coordinate behavior. Therefore, any market institution must determine (1) who will be the evaluator and (2) the price paid or received by each agent. This does not imply that all such market mechanisms will work equally well. As discussed in Smith (1994) the institution can significantly influence behavior and therefore market outcomes. For example, the four most common types of private value auctions, uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock, and Dutch clock auctions are all theoretically equivalent with risk neutral
bidders; yet there is widespread evidence from the laboratory that these distinct formats elicit different behavior which affects market performance. 3 This paper takes the next step towards constructing markets for evaluations by developing variants of these four well-known market institutions and comparing the performance of each. 4 Within the controlled confines of the 2 Avery, et al. (1999) show that markets can solve much more complex problems as well, such as the case where someone else's positive experience only serves as a signal about the probability that one's own experience will be positive. However, as a first step in understanding behavior in markets for evaluations, this study focuses exclusively on the case where everyone's opinion of the outcome, but not necessarily their payoff from it, is the same. 3 For a more comprehensive discussion, the reader is directed to Kagel and Roth (1995) . Two early studies test the strategic equivalence of first-price and Dutch auctions. Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982) both find that (a) prices are higher in first-price auctions than in Dutch auctions and (b) bidding is consistent with risk averse behavior. The predicted isomorphism between English and second-price auctions also fails to be observed. Coppinger et al. (1980) and Kagel et al. (1987) find that bidding in the English outcry auction conforms to the theoretical predictions quite well, while in the one-shot second-price auction bidders consistently bid higher than the dominant strategy prediction, even with experience in the auction mechanism (Kagel and Levin, 1993) . 4 An important distinction between this environment and that of the standard private value auction is that information is considered to be nonrivalrous.
laboratory, these wind-tunnel tests directly compare these institutions to each other, as well as to a baseline case where no market exists.
A.1 No Market Baseline
In the baseline case, a fictitious product is available for evaluation for a limited time, T.
If at any point during this time one of the n individuals consumes and evaluates the product, then the payoff state, good or bad, is revealed to everyone. As a simplification, if the product is good, then everyone who waits receives their own good payoff g i , but if the product is bad, all of the people who wait receive their opportunity cost c i . The evaluator also receives g i if the product is good, but when it is bad, the evaluator receives b i . In this situation the dominant strategy is to wait and see if the others evaluate, regardless of how much time is remaining assuming that the opportunity cost is sufficiently high. Formally, let λ i denote a player i's belief about the probability someone else will evaluate during the remaining time. The expected payoff to
We now consider four different auction formats to provide an evaluation.
A.2. Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction
This auction format requires that each of the n agents submit a single bid β i . This bid represents the minimum amount the person is willing to accept for evaluating the fictitious product. Once the n bidders have submitted their bids, the bids are ranked in ascending order.
Let β and β denote, respectively, the lowest and second lowest submitted bids. The agent submitting bid β is chosen as the evaluator and the price he receives for evaluating is 2
The other n -1 agents wait for the evaluation, and each pays an equal portion of the price, i.e., the price paid by each individual for the information is )
. Hence when entering a bid, agent i knows that β i /(n -1) is the maximum amount she may have to pay for the evaluation. In the event that multiple agents submit the lowest bid, the evaluator is chosen randomly from that subset of bidders.
A.3 Discriminatory Sealed Bid Auction
This second market mechanism is similar to the uniform sealed bid auction in that a bid β i represents a minimum price that agent i will be paid to evaluate and β i /(n -1) represents a maximum amount that agent i could have to pay for the information. Again the bids are ranked from lowest to highest and the person submitting the lowest bid is chosen to evaluate the product. H owever, the price paid by each agent who waits depends upon his bid and the evaluator's bid. Let j denote the person who submitted the lowest bid β.
to the evaluator. The total amount paid to agent j, the evaluator, is
Again, ties are broken randomly.
A.4 English Clock Auction
The English clock auction is operationalized by setting an initial price such that multiple agents are willing to accept the proposed price and then moving the price in the less favorable direction until all but one agent drops out of the auction. Hence, in a standard private value buyer's auction, the initial price is set very low and then clock price ticks upwards until only one buyer remains willing to purchase at the clock price. Since an evaluation market is attempting to procure an evaluation, the process works in the reverse fashion. The initial price on the clock is set sufficiently high such that multiple agents are willing to evaluate the fictitious product and then the price falls until all but one person has indicated a preference to wait (i.e., withdraw from the market and not evaluate) at the current price on the clock. Once a bidder signals to wait, a bidder cannot re-enter the market for that period. The number of active bidders is not publicly stated as the price decrements and bidders withdraw. The clock price, like the bid amount in the sealed bid institutions, refers to the amount that the evaluator receives. Those who wait pay 1/(n -1) of the final clock price. Again, ties are settled randomly. Unlike the sealed bid institutions, this mechanism requires upfront parameterization in the form of a starting price, the amount by which the clock decrements, and the rate of time for the decrement. Additionally, a stopping rule is imposed in the event that the clock price reaches zero with at least two agents still in the market. Since a clock price of zero indicates that at least two agents are willing to undertake the evaluation for no payment, one of these agents is randomly selected to provide the information for free to the remainder of the group.
A.5 Dutch Clock Auction
As with the English clock auction, the Dutch clock auction also involves systematically changing the price until a winner is declared. With this auction, the price is initially set such that nobody is willing to accept the transaction. The price is then gradually improved until some agent accepts the terms. Thus, in the market for evaluations the price is set sufficiently low such that everyone wishes to wait initially and then the price is increased until the first agent agrees to undertake the evaluation for the price shown on the clock. Again the clock price refers to the price received by the evaluator. Each of the n -1 agents who did not indicate a willingness to evaluate pays 1/(n -1) of the amount received by the evaluator. This institution also requires additional parameters for the starting price, minimum amount of the price increment, and the rate at which the price is incremented.
B. Parameters
We chose to compare the institutions with n = 4 participants in each market. The experimental literature is ripe with examples of markets where four sellers or four bidders can be considerably competitive, depending on other details of the environment (see e.g., Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982; Isaac and Walker, 1985; Isaac and Reynolds, 2002; Thomas and Wilson, 2002; and Deck and Wilson, forthcoming) . Table 1 reports the good values, bad values, and opportunity costs for each of four participants in a market. We continue to assume that the product is good or bad with a 50% probability.
Within a group of four agents there is one Type 1, one Type 2, and two Type 3 agents.
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Each agent has an expected value of -10 for evaluating, which is less than the common opportunity cost of 24. However, agents differ in their expected values from another agent 5 The Type 3 agents are similar to those used by Avery and Zeckhauser (1997) in a discussion of a market for evaluations in a similar setting. evaluating. Table 2 lists the expected social surplus depending upon which agent, if any, evaluates.
The socially efficient payoff is for one of the two Type 3 agents to undertake the evaluation, and since there are two Type 3 agents, a unique price exists that supports this outcome assuming all agents are risk neutral.
6
Since the Type 3 agents are identical, the equilibrium price is such that the two type 3 agents are indifferent between evaluating and waiting. That is, the price structure satisfies (g 3 + b 3 )/2 + price received for evaluating = (g 3 + c 3 )/2 -price paid for information. When the price paid for information is 1 1 − n times the price received by the evaluator, the market price that supports the efficient outcome is 54 for the parameters in Table 1 . This price prediction is applicable to the uniform price sealed bid, descending English clock, and ascending Dutch clock auctions because each agent that waits pays the same price. However, this price prediction is not valid for the discriminatory sealed bid auction as the choices of the Type 1 and Type 2 agents will impact the price the evaluator receives. Further, an explicit price prediction would depend on the beliefs bidders have about the likely bids and parameter values of others. 7 Nevertheless, as an exploratory exercise we include it in our comparison of the other three institutions.
We chose the payoffs for the Type 1 and 2 agents so that they ha ve the same expected value for evaluating as the Type 3 agents, but if a Type 1 or 2 agent evaluates, the expected social loss is nontrivial and dependent upon which of the two evaluates. The opportunity cost of 24 satisfies the desirable property that b i + g i < 2c for each agent type. It also creates an essential separation between the social payoff in the case where no one evaluates and the 6 Identical expected values for evaluating generate a nontrivial environment to test how well a market institution induces an optimal evaluation by a Type 3 agent. 7 As a simplifying assumption, most of the previous theoretical and experimental work on private value auctions has assumed that values are distributed uniformly and that this is common knowledge among the market participants. We chose a more challenging environment that parallels naturally occurring economy in which participants only have private information on their own values. efficient case, while maintaining the property that a person who receives a good payoff, a bad payoff, and the opportunity cost will experience nonnegative earnings. 8 Also, an opportunity cost of 24 leads to an integer price prediction that is not a natural focal point.
As discussed above, some of the institutional treatments also require parameterization. In the no market baseline the time available for product for evaluations is T = 30 seconds. Both clock institutions require an increment and an initial price. The clock increment/decrement is 1 and updated every second. The initial prices are set such that a priori the mechanisms would last the same amount of time as the baseline no market treatment. In the no market baseline no one sho uld evaluate and a period lasts 30 seconds. Therefore, the starting price in the English clock auction is 54 + 30 = 84 and the starting price in the Dutch auction is 54 -30 = 24 (which is conveniently the opportunity cost). For the two sealed bid institutions, subjects also have 30 seconds to enter their bids. If a subject does not enter a bid in the allotted time then his previous bid serves as the default. 9 For the payoffs to be comparable across treatments, we desired that each laboratory session consists of the same number of periods and thus each should last approximately the same amount of time.
III. Experimental Procedures
A market consisted of four subjects who were constantly and anonymously matched throughout the 48 decision periods of the experiment. Subjects retained the same agent type each period and never knew the payoff parameters associated with the other subjects or even the distribution of those parameters. Before the experiment began each subject was given a set of written instructions. 10 After all subjects completed the instructions and had the opportunity to ask questions, the computerized experiment began.
For the first 24 periods all subjects, regardless of institution treatment, participated in the no market baseline. This insures that prior to introducing the market mechanism the subjects have substantial experience with the payoff implications for evaluating and not evaluating with good and bad values. When making decisions in the baseline environment, subjects knew their 8 This positive gain property helps prevent a loss of control over a subject's motivation as negative earnings cannot be enforced. This is particularly important in the early stages of the experiment where subjects are relatively inexperienced. 9 Participants in an unpaid pilot experiment indicated that more than 30 seconds was too long and rarely was the 30 second time limit binding. 10 A copy of the instructions is available from the authors upon request.
own payoff parameters and the time remaining in the period. After each period subjects received feedback about their own payoff and whether the product was good or bad that period if and only if someone evaluated. Subjects were not told who evaluated or anyone else's payoff. At any point during the experiment, regardless of treatment, a subject could scroll through a table which displayed for all previous periods their own action, whether or not some else had evaluated, the payoff state if revealed, and their own profit. After the first 24 periods were completed, subjects in the baseline treatment continued in this environment for an additional 24 periods. Subjects in the other four treatments were given additional written instructions about a single market mechanism that would be in place for the next unannounced set of 24 periods. After all subjects read the instructions and had the opportunity to ask questions, the computerized experiment resumed. In addition to the information revealed in the baseline case, subjects in the four market treatments were told the price they paid for waiting or the price received for evaluating. Subjects
were not told the number of periods in the experiment or a portion thereof nor were they informed in advance tha t a mechanism would be imposed in the latter part of the session.
A total of 25 sessions were conducted, five for each the five treatments. We h eld constant across all sessions a random sequence of 48 good and bad value states, i.e., one sequence was randomly determined in advance and then employed in all sessions. This serve s to reduce the variation across sessions.
The 100 p articipants in this study were undergraduates from the general student population at George Mason University, where the experiments were conducted in September,
2002. For participating in the one hour experiment, each subject was paid $7 for showing up on time, plus his or her salient earnings. All payoffs, parameters and prices were denoted in terms of experimental dollars. At the conclusion of the experiment a subject's cumulative profit was converted into US$ at the rate of EXP 200 = US$ 1, which was stated to the subjects prior to the beginning to the experiment. The average earnings in the experiment were approximately $15.25, excluding the $7 show up fee.
IV. Experimental Results
The data consist of observed behavior in 720 periods under the no market baseline and 120 periods under each of the four market mechanisms. We find that each of the market mechanisms is successful at increasing efficiency relative to the baseline by increasing the frequency with which the optimal agent type evaluates. This result is presented as a series of findings, each with supporting analysis that treats each session as an independent observation.
To control for learning, the analysis focuses exclusively on data from the latter half of the periods in a particular institution (periods 13-24 and 37-48).
The first 24 periods in each session consist solely of the baseline situation. Therefore, behavior should be similar across the treatments before the institutions are in operation. The first finding is a largely a calibration result demonstrating that subject behavior is indeed similar across all treatments prior to the implementation of a market mechanism. To compare the choices of individuals and hence performance of the five institutions we use the metric of average ex ante efficiency from a series of periods within a session. This is a measure of the expected social welfare conditioned on the frequency with which agents of a particular type evaluated. Thus, two sessions in which the same numbers of each type undertook the evaluation would be considered as performing identically, even though realized surplus might vary across the sessions depending on who evaluated when the product is good or bad. Since each session is independent of the others, this metric allows for a comparison of independent observational units.
Finding 1: Ex ante efficiency is statistically indistinguishable across all five treatments.
Support: For the null hypothesis that ex ante efficiency in the initial no market phase of the each session did not differ by treatment, we employ a Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test on the 25 average ex ante efficiency observations (one for each session) for periods 13-24. The test statistic, corrected for ties in the rank ing, is 0.467, which cannot be rejected in favor of the two sided null at any standard level of significance. ¦
The frequency with which subjects choose to evaluate is nontrivial in periods 13-24. Figure 1 illustrates when the subjects choose to evaluate during the 30 second period without a market mechanism in place. The hatched bar indicates how many times no one evaluated and the solid bars indicate how many evaluations occurred for the 6 five-second blocks. Notice that when a subject evaluates, it is most often within the first 5 or last 5 seconds of the period. This suggests that our choice of a 30 second period is not too short as subjects either evaluate early or late within a period. Having established that the sessions do not differ prior to the implementation of a market mechanism, any differences across treatments can be attributed directly to the institutions. Therefore, our focus now turns to the impact of the market mechanisms as observed over the last 12 periods of each session.
Finding 2:
The introduction of a market mechanism significantly increases efficiency.
Support: Table 3 and Figure 2 report the average ex ante efficiency by session. Two tests using these data provide the support for this finding. The first is the Fligner Wolfe (FW) test. Unlike the KW test, the FW test allows for a directional ordering of the alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that the no market baseline and all of the market mechanism treatments lead to the same level of ex ante efficiency, while the alternative hypothesis is that all of the market mechanisms weakly improve efficiency and at least one market mechanism strictly improves efficiency. The computed FW statistic is 310 and therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 99% confidence level. Having established that at least one of the market mechanisms strictly improves efficiency, the Wilcox Rank Sum (W) test is used to determine for each specific market mechanism if that mechanism improved efficiency relative to the no market baseline. In each pair wise comparison the W statistic was 40, the largest value possible. Thus, the null hypothesis of no change in efficiency can be rejected at the 99% confidence level in favor of the alternative that the mechanism improved efficiency for each of the four market mechanisms considered. ¦
The above analysis clearly shows that implementing a market for evaluations increases the expected efficiency. The next finding explores the differences between the four market mechanisms in terms of efficiency performance. A separate finding then addresses the source of the institutions' success.
Finding 3: The four market mechanisms are s tatistically indistinguishable with respect to efficiency.
Support: Given no a priori ordering of ex ante efficiency by institution treatment, we employ a KW test to test the null of no difference by mechanism against the alternative that efficiency differs for some institution. Adjusting for ties in the efficiency rankings of individual sessions, the test statistic is 0.352, which means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. ¦ As we mention in the introduction, we assume people have already made the decision to enter a product market and so by design our market mechanisms in periods 25-48 necessarily assign one person to evaluate the fictitious product. This avoids the worst case scenario in terms of ex ante efficiency, namely no one evaluating. However, even when conservatively accounting for the no evaluation outcomes in the baseline groups, efficiency with the four market mechanisms is statistically greater than the no market baseline, though the increase is small-5.3
percentage points. Formally, let M j denote the number of times in periods 37-48 for which no one evaluated in session j in the baseline groups, and let m ij denote the number of times an agent of type i was observed to evaluate voluntarily over the same period in session j. For this conservative test, we recalculate the ex ante efficiency for the no market baseline treatment by allocating one agent, in proportion to the types listed in Table 1 , to be the evaluator for each of the M j periods in which no one voluntarily evaluated. More specifically, the frequency of type i agents evaluating in a no market baseline session is imputed to be m ij + θ i M j , where θ i = 0.5 if i = 3 and θ i = 0.25 for i = 1 and 2. Let E i denote the ex ante efficiency when a type i agent evaluates (see Table 2 ). The recalculated ex ante efficiency for baseline session j is
Given that Finding 3 established the equality of the treatments with respect to efficiency, we use a Wilcox Rank Sum test to compare the recalculated efficiency of the baseline to the observed aggregated efficiency of the market treatments. The null hypothesis of no effect from a market can be rejected at the 95% confidence level in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the market generates higher efficiency. This demonstrates that an auction market increases efficiency by more than would be expected from merely randomly assigning one person to evaluate. We should emphasize that in the market mechanism the subjects are volunteering to evaluate because they each have the choice in their bid to indicate their willingness to evaluate/wait.
While someone will be chosen to evaluate, the market institutions do not always induce the optimal agent evaluate each period as evidenced by the less than 100% reported efficiency in Table 3 . Also, it is not the case that Type 1 and 2 agents are never willing to undertake the evaluation for free. In fact, a suboptimal agent evaluated 30% of the time on average for the last twelve periods in the no market baseline treatment. Thus it remains to be explained the extent to which the markets succeed. Our conjecture is that the performance increase is due to the mechanisms encouraging Type 3 agents to evaluate when no one else will. Finding 4 discusses this explanation formally.
Finding 4: The auction mechanism induces the optimal agent to undertake the evaluation when no one else is willing to do so, thereby increasing efficiency.
Support: Figure 3 illustrates the qualitative support for this finding. The hatched (solid) bars for each treatment indicate the frequency with which each agent type evaluated in periods 13-24 (37-48). The "None" category specifies how many times no agent voluntarily evaluated and contains the same data that is displayed in Figure 1 with Table 4 reports the fixed effects parameter estimates with the ascending Dutch clock auction serving as the basis for comparison. The considerable lack of significance on β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 fixed effects indicates that on average the Descending English clock, Uniform price and Discriminatory price sealed bid auctions result in the same price, respectively, as the Ascending Dutch clock auction. The second part of the finding is supported by a t-test of the null hypothesis that β 0 = 54 against the two-sided alternative. The test statistic is 0.59 with 178 degrees of freedom, which cannot be rejected at standard levels of significance. ¦ While the average price is statistically indistinguishable under each treatment, i t is important to notice that there is considerable variation in observed prices. Figure 4 depicts this price variability. Over the last 12 periods there is one session in each treatment with a median price less than 35. Also, over the last 12 periods one session in each treatment also has a median price over 75. Overall, the lowest median price in a session is 3.25 and the highest is 109.17.
Even after controlling for variation due to the random effects of sessions and the evaluators within each session, considerable variation in the observed prices remains, as evidenced by the size of the standard error on β 0 reported in Table 4 . This suggests that while the theoretical price may characterize the central tendency of behavior in these institutions, it is not the case that people are behaving in strict accordance with the prediction. This can also be gleamed from Table 3 . If each subject behaves as theoretically predicted then in sessions with an operating market institution the ex ante efficiency should be 100%, which it clearly is not.
V. Conclusion
As demonstrated by Avery et al. (1999) a pricing mechanism for product evaluations can increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided.
With a controlled laboratory e xperiment we evaluate the performance of four market mechanisms for providing product evaluations: uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock, and Dutch clock auctions. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous information good that (1) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (2) the four mechanisms are behaviorally equivalent with respect to the prices received by the evaluator.
These efficiency and price results contrast with the standard experimental results of these auction formats for independent values. In laboratory independent private value auctions, prices clearly separate with a relatively small variance across sessions, and efficiency is consistently greater than 95%. In those experiments, buyers' values and surplus are induced with certainty each period. One hypothesis is that the risk in the product value may be a source of the price variability that we find here. We must note that we are changing several features of the product and auction formats, which may individually and/or collectively explain this price variability across sessions. Of course, only a systematic analysis of these differences can reveal the explanation, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Each of the four institutio ns considered improves efficiency by encouraging the optimal agent to undertake the evaluation when no one else is willing to do so. However, it is not the case that agents are never willing to undertake the evaluation for free when no market mechanism is in place. Also, it is not the case the four market mechanisms achieve full efficiency. This suggests that future research should focus on institutions that discourage suboptimal agents from evaluating. There are also many avenues of research to pursue in evaluating the more complex environments and mechanisms in Avery et al. (1999) . ( 
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Figure 4. Prices Received by Evaluator for Periods 37-48
How is your payoff determined? The fictitious product will either be Good or Bad. When you and your counterparts are making your decision to either evaluate or not, you will not know if the product is good or bad. You and your counterparts will know whether it is good or bad only after one of you has chosen to evaluate. There is a 50% chance that the fictitious product will be Good and a 50% chance that it will be Bad. Your payoff depends on whether the product is Good or Bad, if you or a counterpart has chosen to evaluate. If any of you evaluate the good, then your payoff is higher if the product is Good than if it is Bad. Now let's go through an example of how to read the payoffs which are listed in the table. The payoffs in these instructions are for illustrative purposes only. The payoffs in the experiment will be different from those displayed here.
Suppose that you chose to evaluate. Then your payoff would be determined by the first row of the table. The payoffs depend on whether the product is Good or Bad. If the product is Good, your payoff would be 140. If the product is Bad, your payoff would be -180.
Suppose that while you are waiting, your counterpart chooses to evaluate. In this case the second row displays your payoff. If the product is Good, your payoff would be 140. If the product is Bad, your payoff would be 30.
Finally, if none of you decide to evaluate, then your payoff is shown on the bottom row. Notice that your payoff will be 30, regardless of the product being Good or Bad. None of you will know the state of the product that period because none of you chose to evaluate it.
At the end of the period you will have 5 seconds to review the results. At the end of that time, the clock will reappear and the next period will begin. Your counterparts' payoffs may or may not be the same as yours.
At the end of the experiment, your experimental dollars will be converted into cash at the rate of 200 experimental dollars for one US$.
Any questions? If not, please raise your hand to indicate that you have finished reading the instructions.
(Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction Instructions )
For the next portion of the experiment, the way you and your counterparts' payoffs are determined based on the fictitious good will remain the same, but all of you will be bidding to pay to Wait and to get paid to Evaluate. In each period of the experiment you will continue to be matched with the same three counterparts.
This is what your screen will look like in the next portion of the experiment. Each period there will be three people who will wait and one person who will evaluate. Whether you wait or evaluate depends upon the bids that you and the other three people submit.
At the beginning of each period you will submit a bid for the "Price Received to Evaluate". This is the amount you are willing to be paid to evaluate. One-third of this bid also serves as the price you are willing to pay to wait.
Once all of the bids have been submitted, the computer ranks the bids from lowest to highest. The person who is chosen to evaluate is the person who submits the lowest bid. (Any ties will be broken randomly.) This person will receive as payment the average of her bid and the second lowest bid. Hence, the person who evaluates will always be paid at least as much as the bid that she submitted. This amount will be recorded in the "Price" column and will be added to the "My Payoff" column for that period.
(Discriminatory Price Sealed Bid Auction Instructions )
Once all of the bids have been submitted, the computer ranks the bids from lowest to highest. The person who is chosen to evaluate is the person who submits the lowest bid. (Any ties will be broken randomly.)
The three people who submitted the three highest bids will each pay the evaluator. The amount that each waiter pays has two factors. The first factor is the average of their own bid and the lowest bid. This amount is then multiplied by 1/3 (or equivalently divided by 3) because each of the three waiters pays the evaluator. This amount will be recorded in the "Price" column and will be subtracted from the "My Payoff" column for that period. Notice that these three people will not pay more than the amount they each submitted as the "Price Paid to Wait".
The evaluator will receive as payment each of the amounts paid by the three waiters. Notice that the evaluator will always be paid at least as much as the bid that she submitted. This amount will be recorded in the "Price" column and will be added to the "My Payoff" column for that period.
Just as before, the evaluator will also receive a payoff depending upon whether the product is Good or Bad.
At the end of the period you will have 5 seconds to review the results. At the end of that time, the next period will begin. If you do not submit a new bid before the time on the clock expires, the computer will use last period's bid as the bid for the current period.
At the end of the experiment, your experimental dollars will also be converted into cash at the rate of 200 experimental dollars for one US$.
(Ascending Clock Auction Instructions )
This is what your screen will look like in the next portion of the experiment. At the beginning of each period the "Price Received to Evaluate" starts at a price of 24 and then continues to increase by one experimental dollar each second. The "Price Received to Evaluate" will increase until the first person clicks on the Evaluate button. The first person who clicks on the Evaluate button will evaluate the product and receive as payment from the three counterparts the amount in "Price Received to Evaluate" box. This amount will be recorded in the "Price" column and will be added to the "My Payoff" column for that period.
The three other people who did not click on the Evaluate button will wait that particular period. The three waiters will each pay the amount next to the label "Price Paid to Wait". This amount will be subtracted from the "My Payoff" column. Notice that because there are three waiters, the amount paid by each waiter is 1/3 of the price received by the evaluator.
At the end of the period you will have 5 seconds to review the results. At the end of that time, the prices will again start at 24 and will increase until one person clicks on the Evaluate button.
(Descending Clock Auction Instructions )
This is what your screen will look like in the next portion of the experiment. At the beginning of each period the "Price Received to Evaluate" starts at a price of 84 and then continues to decrease by one experimental dollar each second. The "Price Received to Evaluate" will decrease until the first three people click on the Wait button. The remaining person who has not clicked on the Wait button will evaluate the product and receive as payment from the three counterparts the amount in "Price Received to Evaluate" box. This amount will be recorded in the "Price" column and will be added to the "My Payoff" column for that period.
The three other people who clicked on the Wait button will wait that particular period. The three waiters will each pay the amount next to the label "Price Paid to Wait". This amount will be subtracted from the "My Payoff" column. Notice that because there are three waiters, the amount paid by each waiter is 1/3 of the price received by the evaluator.
If the "Price Received to Evaluate" falls to zero and there are still at least two people who have not clicked on the "Wait" button, then one of the people who has not clicked the button will be randomly selected to be the evaluator and will receive zero (because by not clicking the "Wait" button the person has indicated that they are willing to receiving nothing for evaluating).
At the end of the period you will have 5 seconds to review the results. At the end of that time, the prices will again start at 84 and will decrease until the first three people click on the Wait button.
